 Jorge I. Dominguez, a resident of Center Harbor, New Hampshire, and a Harvard University graduate in political science, is a writer and a publisher with extensive knowledge of international politics, especially in Latin America. One of Jorge I. Dominguez's notable works is "The Cuban Economy in a New Era: An Agenda for Change toward Durable Development."
Cuba's economy has undergone significant changes throughout its history. Before the 1959 revolution, it relied heavily on exporting agricultural products such as sugar and tobacco and foreign investment, mainly from the United States. After the revolution, the government implemented a centrally planned economy, nationalizing many industries and receiving support from the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a severe economic downturn known as the "Special Period," which resulted in shortages and rationing of goods. Under President Raul Castro, the Cuban economy suffered from a failing sugar industry, stagnant agriculture, outdated infrastructure, and the weakening of the Venezuelan economy (which it depended on for oil and financial aid). These predicaments were due to the inefficiency of Cuba's centralized planning and state-controlled economic model. Despite some market-oriented reforms and opening to foreign investment, the country had not achieved its goals for sustainable development. After taking office in 2018, Diaz-Canel, the new president, slowly implemented changes in Cuba, like a new constitution and market economics within the socialist state. However, the leadership's main goal was (and remains) "continuity" and not systemic reform, disappointing many Cubans. US-Cuba relations under former President Trump impeded Cuba's efforts at economic growth as Trump reversed many of Obama's initiatives to ease US policy on Cuba and tightened restrictions on commerce and travel. These policies, combined with Venezuela's economic collapse and US sanctions, led to the worst economic crisis in Cuba since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The current US President Biden left Trump's restrictions in place during a 15-month policy review and recently eased some sanctions but did not return to normalization.
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 A writer and publisher with a decades-long career, Jorge I. Dominguez is a retired Harvard professor who studied the Cold War’s political, economic, and social impacts on Latin American countries. In collaboration with Rafael M. Hernandez and Lorena G. Barberia, Jorge I. Dominguez published his book Debating U.S.-Cuban Relations: How Should We Now Play Ball? 2nd Edition (Debating U.S.-Cuban Relations), which details Cuba’s relationship with the U.S. and other western countries.
Debating U.S.-Cuban Relations uses the events of a real-life baseball game in 2017 to explain the format of the book. US and Cuban political officials watched the game together and shared refreshments. Rather than comparing Cuban Cold War policy to the competitive aspects of the game, Mr. Dominguez and his colleagues instead emphasize the improvement in relations between the two countries. The second edition of Debating U.S.-Cuba Relations differs greatly from the first version of this project, which was published during the Cold War. It focuses on six subject areas, going beyond the political, social, and economic issues facing American-Cuban relations. The authors also analyze hypothetical national security issues. The six sections also propose normalization methods, like improving immigration policy and encouraging scholarly discourse between the two countries.  Originally from Havana, Cuba, Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez is a writer and publisher who has taught extensively on international trade and politics. With a strong focus on trends in commerce, Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez keeps a close watch on developments in Latin America.
One major change in US policy regarding Venezuela took place in November 2022, with the government providing Chevron with limited authorization for extracting oil from the economically challenged nation. One major issue was that, taking steps against the regime of President Nicolas Maduro, President Trump had ordered an embargo on Venezuelan oil in 2020. The new agreement, granted under a Treasury Department license, provides Chevron, a California-based oil company, the right to resume pumping from fields on which production was halted years ago. These activities are being undertaken in a joint venture with Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA), a nationalized company. With escalating energy needs at a time of war in Ukraine a backdrop, the agreement is also seen as opening doors for other oil companies around the globe to do business with PdVSA. As part of the deal, President Maduro reached an agreement with the opposition coalition, Unitary Platform, to both institute humanitarian reforms and strengthen negotiations on the parameters of democratic elections in the nation once again.  A writer and publisher who taught at Harvard University for decades, Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez focuses on international trade and politics, with an emphasis on Cuba and Latin America. A distinct area of knowledge for Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez is economic relations across the region, and he maintains a strong interest in Latin American policy developments.
As explored in a JD Supra article, the “Washington Consensus” defined the U.S. approach to Latin American relations in the 1980s and early 1990s. This brought focus to macroeconomic discipline and reorienting markets to meet international demand, while limiting the effects of inflation. Reforms recommended in tandem with institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund spanned tax reform, public expenditures, interest rate liberalization, and competitive exchange rates. In addition, the legal security associated with strong property rights was emphasized. Today, the emerging view is that the Washington Consensus was at least partly a failure. It did not consistently boost economic growth, and it often failed to make a dent in persistently high poverty and employment rates. Even the seven years in the 1990s, in which substantial growth did occur, were bedeviled by recession and stagnation. One major issue has been a lack of equity, with Washington Consensus policies seen as only benefiting a few, instead of the general populace. Moving forward, policy experts are looking at deepening economic cooperation in ways that go beyond narrow development objectives that emphasize developing countries simply increasing GDP.  Former Harvard University professor Jorge I. Dominguez served as the vice provost for international affairs for nine years. Jorge I. Dominguez supported the expansion of the faculty and implemented various student programs in this position.
Mentor relationships provide an effective means of passing on information and significantly impact both mentees and mentors. Mentors serve as role models for mentees and provide an avenue for self-improvement in areas such as leadership skills. Further, mentees can receive exposure to new environments and circumstances. Mentors offer different points of view or techniques for solving problems. Students, as mentees, gain much value from mentorship programs. For instance, mentors often introduce students to members of their social circles, providing them access to professionals established in their fields. The experience and networking accelerate the students’ growth, expanding their worldview and providing significant real-life experiences. Undergoing mentorship programs also boosts students' confidence while preparing them for future opportunities and career paths.  A former professor of comparative and international political science, Jorge I. Dominguez had a longstanding relationship with Harvard University that spanned roughly five decades. Jorge Dominguez is also an experienced writer who has written and published several books on Latin American political science and democratic development.
The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders is a political science article that delves into the contemporary state and historical evolution of the political system of practice in select socialist states, including Cuba and Vietnam. The communist regimes in the selected states are arguably tenacious, given that they survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and European communist regimes. Although communist regimes like Cuba and Vietnam claim that their political systems are outright democratic, the factual basis of such claims remains obscure since each state has changed its procedures from the baseline system over the years. Therefore, The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders investigates the validity of these claims and, for the most part, finds them wanting.  The former chair of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies, Jorge I. Dominguez is an expert on Latin American relations. Jorge Dominguez has written many articles in that field, such as one covering the changing proportion of Mexican residents who are entering the United States illegally.
Although Mexicans are often associated with illegal immigration, their proportion of undocumented arrivals is actually decreasing. In fiscal year 2019, 62 percent of undocumented immigrants came from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, as opposed to only 25 percent from Mexico. This is a sharp drop from 2004, when as many as 92 percent of undocumented arrivals were Mexican. This change is also reflected in the overall tally of Mexicans living illegally in the United States. In 2017, 4.9 million Mexicans were in this category, compared to 10.5 million unauthorized residents from all countries, placing Mexicans in the minority for the first time in 50 years. Why this change in the 21st century? Various explanations have been offered, such as border walls, fewer interdictions, and improvement in the Mexican economy. However, demography is likely the most valid reason. The Mexican birth rate has fallen from 29.1 per 1,000 in 1990 to 16.6 per 1,000 in 2022, paralleling a rise in contraception among Mexican women.  An expert in US-Cuban relations, retired Harvard professor Jorge I. Dominguez is the author of six books on the subject. Jorge I. Dominguez has also published many articles on Cuban-American foreign policy, such as one that summarizes policy changes over the years and anticipates new diplomatic initiatives from the Biden Administration.
Tensions between the two nations have waxed and waned for decades as the Cuban Government has instituted economic and political reforms (often in response to changes in American foreign policy), only to reverse them later. The years 2014 to 2016 saw a thaw in relations, as the Obama Administration renewed cooperation between the nations on issues such as drug trafficking and immigration. The Trump Administration reversed course by reducing international law enforcement ties and cutting the number of visas granted. Observers have claimed these latter decisions have strengthened authoritarian tendencies in Cuba. The inauguration of President Biden signaled yet another policy shift. Cuban-Americans can once again apply for permission for family members to move to America. Restrictions on remittances (payments sent by Cuban-Americans to their families in Cuba) have been liberalized. In addition, money transfers between American and Cuban banks have been facilitated, and entrepreneurs now enjoy increased Internet access. Finally, flights to cities other than Havana have been added, making intercultural and educational visits easier to arrange.  Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez is a longtime academic who taught at Harvard University and held a position as Antonio Madero Professor for the Study of Mexico. With a focus on trade and economic policy, Dr. Jorge I. Dominguez particularly focuses on bilateral relations between countries such as the United States and Mexico.
A late 2021 Reuters article brought focus to the implications of the US Trade Representative’s commitment to bolstering its domestic electric vehicle (EV) industry. The proposal at hand involves a $12,500 tax credit that would encompass $4,500 reserved for EVs manufactured in the United States by union employees. It is included within wide-ranging legislation spanning areas such as social spending and climate change. Popular among certain domestic industries, such a move is seen by other nations as a protectionist policy in violation of various trade agreements. In October, Mexico, alongside Canada, EU members, Japan, and South Korea, wrote to American lawmakers claiming that the tax credit went against international trade rules. Mexico went even further, calling the proposed credit potentially more harmful to its export-focused auto industry than former President Trump’s threatened tariff of 25 percent. In particular, country-of-origin conditions tied to the incentive are characterized as an "undue subsidy.” Mexico’s undersecretary for foreign trade tempered this adversarial stance by acknowledging the legitimacy of a transition toward electromobility and climate-friendly electric vehicles. Between Change and Rigidity, Reform and Repression Can Cuba’s ruling Communist Party undertake reforms? A reform agenda may start with a slogan made popular elsewhere in Latin America (¡Que se vayan todos!) – out with everyone in national leadership posts. In fact, the April 2021 Party Congress approximated that goal. All members of the Party’s national Secretariat were replaced, as were half of the members of the Political Bureau and half of the key provincial officials (the First Party Secretaries). Eleven of the thirteen active-duty Generals serving on the Central Committee also departed, as did three out of five of all Central Committee members. Leaving the Party’s Political Bureau were President Raúl Castro, former Interior Minister Ramiro Valdés, and long-time Party Organization Secretary José Ramón Machado, among other notables who had ruled for decades. More typical had been the outcome of the 2016 Party Congress, when none such notables left, only one in ten of the “political” Generals was new to the Central Committee, and the majority of the Secretariat held on. A reform agenda would also require greater leadership pluralism to prevent a small clique from undertaking all decisions. This, too, has been happening. In 2016, about a quarter of the ministers had also served on the Council of State, hence approving their own proposals. The 2019 Constitution brought to zero the overlap between the Council of Ministers and the Council of State. The 2021 Party Congress also reduced the overlap between the two Councils, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Party’s Political Bureau and Central Committee. In this century, greater demographic inclusion has been the rule as well, doubling the proportion of Afrodescendants in Council of State posts and bringing their share and that of 1 women on this Council closer to their respective shares of the population. The median age in elite institutions has fallen; new Central Committee members must be below age sixty. So, why the unprecedented nationwide protests in July 2021 – thousands of people protesting on the streets of three dozen cities across the provinces – and what was new in 2021? Cuba’s economic stagnation, in effect near zero growth for a decade, does not explain the July protests. Nor do U.S. economic sanctions in place for decades, notwithstanding Trump administration enhancements. Nor does the equally long authoritarian regime. Nor do the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. If so, the protests would have occurred well before. In 2021, much changed. The economy stopped stagnating: It nosedived. Access to food became a severe problem. In January, the top leadership adopted a dramatic monetary and exchange rate reform. Inadequate planning unleashed a remarkably high inflation rate, followed by frequent policy “fixes” for specific problems, which contributed to renewed and ongoing policy uncertainties. A frightening Covid-19 spike in June vaulted Cuba from one of the more successful pandemic managers to one of the world’s worst-afflicted countries. As the very hot Caribbean summer approached, in late June the electric power system broke down, propelling people out of their homes. Too much time following the April 2021 Party Congress focused on building new relationships and bonds of authority between the top leaders – career veterans but new to being at the top – and intermediate Party and government ranks. Decision making processes, never speedy, slowed. How did the nation’s leaders respond? The top leaders were surprised by, and unprepared for, the July protests. Their initial response was confused and contradictory. Early steps of conciliation and police restraint were followed by Special Troops and police repression (beatings, arrests, summary trials) across the nation. Following explanations of practical 2 problems, especially by the prime minister, the official blame for the protests soon fell on “outside agitators,” such as U.S. agencies and Cuban diaspora members. Following the July protests, which made significant use of social media, the government also enacted new rules to criminalize actions through the Internet that may have an adverse “impact on Cuba’s prestige,” criticize the content of the authoritarian Constitution, seek to “compel public authorities to act or to fail to act” while performing their duties, or “damage the reputation” of government officials. The 2019 Constitution promised improvements in its charter of rights, but their implementation has been deferred, as these responses to the July protests make clear. Moreover, the government has failed to make effective use of its own noncompetitive national elections. For example, at the last national single-party election in 2018, three quarters of the members of the Council of State would have been ineligible to serve on the Council if the electoral law had required having been the top vote getter in a municipality; more than half would have been ineligible to serve on the Council if the electoral law had mandated having finished in the top half of vote receivers in their respective provinces. The government has not made effective use of its own authoritarian-regime electoral law to promote its more popular politicians into key national posts. Thus, can Cuba’s Communist Party undertake reforms beyond renewing and widening its top leadership circles? Its most positive response following the July 2021 protests has been the formal and final approval of reforms to permit the freer growth of small- and medium-sized private sector businesses and cooperatives. Such reforms had been under consideration since the Fall 2010! The leadership may need a “win” before it adopts wider reforms and does so more quickly. The government chose to develop Cuba’s own vaccines against Covid-19. It claims to 3 have succeeded with two, not yet approved by the World Health Organization and pending independent peer review. Success with these vaccines could permit the reactivation of international tourism, announced for mid-November 2021, even if not from the United States yet, reactivating the economy while also addressing the public health crisis. With such new breathing room, the pace of economic reform may accelerate. The near-term challenge is simpler. Do government and Party leaders believe their own propaganda that the causes of the protests all lie outside the nation’s boundaries? Shakespeare’s Cassius, in Julius Caesar (I:2, 145) provides good advice: “The fault, Dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves…” The fault, dear President Miguel Díaz-Canel, lies not in the U.S. government or in southern Florida but in a leadership and policy regime in Cuba, both in desperate need of bold and swifter change. via WordPress https://ift.tt/3GPh0Tp |
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